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ABSTRACT
Smartphones store a significant amount of personal and private
information, and are playing an increasingly important role in
people’s lives. It is important for authentication techniques to be
more resistant against two known attacks called shoulder surfing
and smudge attacks. In this work, we propose a new technique
called 3D Pattern. Our 3D Pattern technique takes advantage of
a new input paradigm called pre-touch, which could soon allow
smartphones to sense a user’s finger position at some distance
from the screen. We implement the technique and evaluate it in
a pilot study (n=6) by comparing it to PIN and pattern locks. Our
results show that although our prototype takes about 8 seconds to
authenticate, it is immune to smudge attacks and promises to be
more resistant to shoulder surfing.
1 INTRODUCTION
Smartphones are increasingly used to store private information
such as personal photos, contacts, and financial information. How-
ever, smartphones are also frequently used in public spaces or in
social gatherings, necessitating the protection of this private in-
formation via user authentication. Authentication or “unlocking”
techniques include the common manual (e.g., PINs and gesture-
based pattern locks) and biometric (e.g., fingerprint reading, iris
scanning, and face recognition) techniques, and less commonly
continuous authentication techniques, which continuously monitor
the user’s behaviour, such as touch or swipe patterns, locking the
device if it believes a different person has started to use it.
In this work, we focus on manual authentication techniques,
because they are among the most common techniques used on
smartphones as a way to protect private information. Even users
utilizing fingerprint readers often are required to enter a PIN for
added security, for example, when rebooting or authorizing pay-
ments.
Harbach et al. [10] showed that bystanders looking at other peo-
ple’s phones as they type their PIN (“shoulder surfers”) are able
to reliably deduce the PINs. This unfortunately hinders the effec-
tiveness of PINs. Many different PIN entry techniques have been
proposed to improve shoulder-surfing resistance, such as scram-
bled keyboards [23], haptic and sound-based PINs [2], gestures
(including swiping) [25], graphical PINs [5], and techniques based
on remembered user behaviour [3]. In general, techniques have
a tradeoff between performance and resistance to shoulder surf-
ing [10].
Recently, there has been a move towards creating systems that
support pre-touch sensing, that is, using information about user’s
fingers just before the screen is actually touched [12, 15, 26]. Simi-
larly to how pre-touch information has been used for expanding
target selection [27], we identify an opportunity to apply pre-touch
sensing to improve the effectiveness of PIN entry techniques. We
create a novel version of the Android pattern lock that expands the
traditional 3×3 grid out of the screen into a 3×3×3 cube. Points are
connected by moving a finger in 3D space above the surface of the
phone. Because pre-touch information is not available on current
smartphones, we simulate pre-touch using a motion capture system.
This enables us to implement a prototype version of the 3D Pattern
lock.
A pilot study with six participants shows that the 3D Pattern
technique is slower and more error-prone than the PIN and pattern
techniques. These results could be partially attributed to the novelty
of pre-touch input and the motion-capture approach used by the
prototype, both of which would be ameliorated when pre-touch
input becomes available in commonly used devices. We also find
that the 3D Pattern technique has increased shoulder-surfing resis-
tance compared to PINs. Further, the empirical CDF indicates that
a larger study could reveal an improvement in shoulder-surfing
resistance over the pattern technique as well. Finally, the 3D Pattern
technique is naturally immune to smudge attacks [1].
The main contributions of this paper are (1) the design of a novel
smartphone authentication technique called 3D Pattern using pre-
touch, and (2) an implementation and evaluation of the 3D Pattern
technique in comparison to conventional PIN and pattern locks.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
In this section, we discuss different types of attacks against smart-
phone authentication techniques, as well as past techniques de-
signed to defend against these attacks.
2.1 Shoulder Surfing
Shoulder surfing is a widely known attack in which the adver-
sary tries to infer the victim’s authentication secret by looking
over his or her shoulder. There is a significant body of research
into mitigating the impact of shoulder-surfing attacks. An in-depth
survey conducted by Eiband et al. [7] considered the threat not
only in the context of authentication, but also in the context of
routine smartphone usage. The survey showed that 130 out of 174
participants indicated that shoulder-surfing attacks occurred on
public transportation. Victims most commonly defended against
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such an attack by modifying their posture or cancelling the authen-
tication. Furthermore, a study conducted by Harbach et al. [11]
found the perceived risk of shoulder surfing to be high in only 11
of 3410 situations. This demonstrates that people are not actively
defending themselves against shoulder surfing, and more work is
needed to improve the shoulder-surfing resistance of authentication
techniques.
There is significant amount of previous work that has attempted
to address shoulder surfing, but the proposed solutions either do
not adequately defend against shoulder surfing or result in other
problems such as longer authentication times or increased error
rates.
2.2 Smudge Attacks
PIN keypads and pattern locks are commonly used methods for
phone authentication. Unfortunately, these techniques are vulnera-
ble to smudge attacks, because the user leaves oily residues on the
screen. Previous work has demonstrated that smudge attacks are
especially effective on pattern locks as users drag their fingers over
the screen. Smudge attacks can also be used to limit the input space
for PIN locks. Aviv et al. [1] found that as long as the line of sight
is not perpendicular, it is easy to observe entered patterns based
on smudges. Under ideal conditions, 92% of the patterns entered
were partially identifiable and 68% of the entered patterns were
fully recoverable. Under less ideal conditions, 37% of the patterns
were partially recoverable and 14% were fully recoverable.
These results demonstrate that even if the adversary is not able
to actively observe the process of authentication, he or she can still
recover the password with considerable success. In our work, we
leverage pre-touch information to limit the number of touches the
user makes on the screen, mitigating the effect of smudge attacks.
2.3 PIN and Password Locks
Before the advent of smartphones, Tan et al. [24] devised a password
entry technique designed for a computer mouse; however, a similar
method could be applied for touchscreens. In this technique, the
user presses left and right to subtly highlight a letter on a scrambled
keyboard. The user then uses the mouse to drag a tile on top of this
letter. While dragging, the scrambled keyboard letters disappear so
an onlooker cannot tell which letter is being selected.
Now that smartphones are commonplace, traditional authenti-
cation techniques have been adapted to work on the small touch-
screens of smartphones. Kovelamudi et al. [16] compared speed and
shoulder-surfing resistance of a scrambled PIN entry keypad and a
normal PIN entry keypad. They found that the scrambled keypad
was slower but more resistant to shoulder surfing.
Several works have examined the possibility of augmenting PIN
keypads with gestures. SwiPIN, by von Zezschwitz et al. [25], di-
vided the PIN keypad into two sections. Each number in each section
corresponded to a different swipe gesture direction. Performing
a swipe gesture on the correct section of the screen would insert
the corresponding number. Their study demonstrated that this
technique improved resistance against smudge attacks. Khan et al.
introduced “ForcePINs” [14], with which each PIN digit could be
entered with different levels of finger pressure on the screen, to
add an additional layer of challenge for shoulder surfers. However,
results showed that there was no statistically significant difference
in shoulder-surfing resistance between regular PINs and ForcePINs,
because when users pressed harder, they also pressed for a notice-
ably longer time.
Other works have looked beyond purely visual representations
of PINs by incorporating haptic and audio feedback. Bianchi et
al. [2] created an observation-resistant authentication technique
by providing no visual clues to the user. The technique renders a
wheel on the screen with identical sections. However, when users
drag their fingers over the sections of the wheel, tactile feedback is
presented with varying lengths and strengths. To select a section,
users drag their fingers to the middle of the wheel. After each
entry, the sections are shuffled to provide resistance against smudge
attacks. Similarly, VibraInput [17] used an on-screen, rotary wheel
with two levels. The outer level contained the letters A through
D, each corresponding to a fixed vibration pattern (that has to be
remembered by user). The inner level corresponded to the PIN
numbers 0 through 9. Upon starting PIN entry, the phone would
vibrate the pattern of a letter. The user would then rotate the outer
wheel to align the letter with the number to select on the inner
wheel. By repeating this process, the technique could use process
of elimination to ascertain the PIN number. The overall technique
would repeat until the entire PIN was entered.
Two-Thumbs-Up (TTU) [20] prevents shoulder-surfing attacks
by requiring the user to cover the screen with their hands. This
forms a “handshield” and enters a challenge mode. If users move
their hands away from the screen, the authentication technique
disappears. TTU randomly associates five “response” letters with
two digits each, presenting the digits and letters on either side of
the screen. The user then has to tap on the letter corresponding
to the next PIN digit. After a certain number (dependent on PIN
length) of correctly selected letters, the authentication process is
complete.
2.4 Pattern Locks
Harbach at al. [10] focused on comparing PIN locks and pattern
locks. They were able to observe the behaviour of 134 smartphone
users over one month, revealing differences between the two tech-
niques. Results showed that although pattern locks are faster, users
are six times as likely to make mistakes compared to PIN locks.
When including failed attempts, there were no differences in au-
thentication time between the two techniques. When a user made a
mistake entering a PIN or pattern, subsequent successful attempts
took more time, presumably because the user took more care when
repeating the authentication. Visual feedback did not influence the
error rate nor the entry time. Similarly, our 3D Pattern technique
improves shoulder-surfing resistance by reducing visual feedback
during authentication.
De Luca et al. suggested using a stroke-based visual authentica-
tion scheme [6], expecting visual patterns to be easier to remem-
ber in comparison to traditional numeric PINs or alphanumeric
passwords. A similar technique, the pattern lock, was ultimately
incorporated into the Android operating system. Unfortunately, as
outlined above, pattern locks have been shown to be weak against
shoulder surfing and smudge attacks. In contrast, DRAW-A-PIN, by
Nguyen et al. [19], has the user draw each PIN digit on the screen
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using their finger. Results indicated that this approach was capable
of mitigating shoulder surfing attacks.
2.5 Graphical
Another category of PIN entry techniques uses pictures or other
graphics. In SemanticLock [21], users arrange icons on the screen
in a memorable way. The user is authenticated based on correct
placement of the icons. In a similar work, Awase-E [22], Takada
and Koike leverage photos taken on a user’s smartphone. The lock
screen breaks a user-chosen photograph up into smaller chunks,
and shows nine chunks of various photographs all at once. The
user then has to select the tile from the correct photograph four
times in a row to unlock the phone.
2.6 Small-Scale Interaction
Several works have attempted to mitigate the impact of smudge
attacks by limiting the touch interaction to a small area on the
screen. TinyLock [18] resists smudge attacks without trading off
usability. Users draw their pattern in a tiny grid, making it harder to
observe finger motions due to the small interaction area. To finish
authentication, the user rotates a virtual wheel on top of the grid,
distorting the smudges from the pattern. Similarly, ClickPattern [9]
shows a keypad in a randomly shuffled order in a small area at the
bottom of the screen. The user presses the keys to enter numbers
corresponding to a pattern. This technique has the same lack of
shoulder surfing resistance as the Android pattern lock because the
pattern is visualized on the screen. However, it improves smudge
attack resistance because of the small input area on the screen. Our
3D Pattern technique avoids the need to limit the interaction area
by not requiring the user’s finger to make contact with the screen.
2.7 Behavioural Authentication
There is considerable research exploringwhether or not lock screens
are even necessary at all, by applying continuous authentication,
also known as implicit authentication. Continuous authentication
systems analyze an individual’s regular patterns of touches on
the screen, and build a model. A different user would have differ-
ent patterns, and could be denied access by the system. With the
Touchalytics project [8], Frank et al. were able to use continuous
authentication to identify the user with an error rate below 4%,
even after a week of elapsed time between training and testing.
Unfortunately, Khan et al. [13] showed that an attacker, merely
watching a video of the target using their phone, could bypass
swipe-based continuous authentication at least 75% of the time.
Some work has explored applying the principles of continu-
ous authentication to augment traditional lock screen techniques.
Buschek et al. [3] use spatial touch features in addition to previ-
ously used temporal touch features on keyboards to verify users
based on their individual text entry behaviours. Examples of spa-
tial touch features include touch offsets, angles, and pressures. By
incorporating such spatial features, user recognition accuracy was
improved.
2.8 Pre-Touch
Many recent works on touchscreen interactions have started ex-
ploring pre-touch information; that is, positional information about
the user’s hands or fingers before making contact with the screen.
For example, with TouchCuts and TouchZoom, Yang et al. [27] used
pre-touch finger distance to expand nearby targets on screen, facil-
itating easier target selection. This general approach has not yet
been explored in the context of authentication techniques resistant
to shoulder surfing.
Another common application of pre-touch information is for
reducing the perceived latency of touchscreen interactions. Xia et
al. employed this approach for tabletop displays [26], achieving a
touch location prediction error of about 1 cm. The approach was
implemented by tracking the user’s index finger location using mo-
tion capture with fiducial markers, which are small retro-reflective
spheres that can be precisely tracked by IR cameras. In the proto-
type of our 3D Pattern technique, we also use a motion capture
system for finger position tracking.
We anticipate pre-touch sensing to become available on com-
modity smartphones in the near future. In 2016, Hinckley et al. [12]
explored how a smartphone with a self-capacitance touchscreen
could enable pre-touch information to be sensed, and applied this
information in various smartphone applications. We envision that
our pre-touch PIN entry techniques will be able to be used on
smartphones without additional motion tracking hardware.
3 GOALS AND THREAT MODEL
We assume that the attacker is in close vicinity of the victim during
authentication or has a video (e.g., from security camera footage)
of the victim authenticating, enabling shoulder-surfing attacks. In
regards to smudge attacks, the attacker may have a brief period
of physical access to the phone after the victim has authenticated,
allowing the attacker time to observe smudges on the screen and
potentially deduce the credentials. We consider specialized attacks
such as acoustic side-channel attacks [4] to be outside the scope of
this work.
With this threat model in mind, we propose the following goals
for a pre-touch augmented PIN entry technique:
• protect against shoulder-surfing and smudge attacks;
• leverage pre-touch information of the user’s finger;
• not involve significant extra cognitive load or memorization
on the part of the user (e.g., unlike previous acoustic PIN
entry techniques, which rely on the user remembering sound
associations); and
• be not significantly slower or more error-prone than other
conventional techniques (e.g., PIN, Android pattern lock).
4 PIN ENTRY TECHNIQUES
In this section, we describe in detail the three techniques we imple-
mented for PIN entry: PIN, pattern, and 3D Pattern.
Our implementations of the PIN and pattern locks are designed
to be as similar as possible to Android’s built-in PIN and pattern
locks, respectively. For the PIN keypad, we present the numbers
zero through nine in a grid along with the masked-out PIN on the
screen. For the pattern lock, we present a 3 × 3 grid of points on
the screen, which users connect together by dragging their finger
from point to point. A line is drawn between the points that the
user connects.
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Figure 1: Cylinder representation of our implementation of
the 3D Pattern technique. The cylinders are coloured de-
pending on the layer they represent. Users must only hold
their finger within the layer of the cylinder to select the cor-
responding point during authentication.
4.1 3D Pattern Lock
The 3D Pattern lock is inspired by Android’s conventional pattern
lock. A simple adaptation of the pattern lock to a pre-touch environ-
ment would be to duplicate the normal 3×3 grid of points, but have
users enter the pattern with their finger hovering over the screen
rather than touching it, thus eliminating the smudge attack vector.
This simple “hover pattern” use of pre-touch should maintain most
of the security and usability properties of the normal pattern lock,
save for being immune to smudge attacks, and so we do not analyze
this technique in detail. Instead, our novel idea is to use pre-touch
information to extend the pattern lock concept into a full third “z”
dimension. Rather than a 3 × 3 grid of circles, our 3D Pattern lock
is a 3 × 3 × 3 cube of cylinders (see Figure 1). By using cylinders,
users do not have to think about where to place their fingers within
a layer, only about which layer to place their finger within. This
simplifies the rendering of depth cues. The smartphone renders an
orthogonal projection of the cube (see Figure 2a). Each depth, or
“layer”, of the cube is represented in a different colour. The user
authenticates by connecting the points in a chosen sequence. Our
technique does not require users to slide their fingers on the screen.
This inherently protects against smudge attacks since users will
not leave oily residues on the screen.
Assuming that the user is allowed to connect any four points
such that no point is reused, a theoretical password space upper
bound is 27× 26× 24× 23 = 387504 patterns. However, as a further
improvement to usability, we limit the space of valid 3D patterns
to include only those that start on the topmost layer, do not bypass
the middle layer, do not bypass a point within a layer or use a
point more than once (as with the traditional Android pattern
lock), and do not connect points across a layer with a distance of
more than
√
3 units (to avoid difficult-to-input diagonal lines). Even
with these assumptions, the password space for the 3D Pattern
technique is still larger than previous conventional techniques.
Using a recursive algorithm in Python, we found 19192 possible 3D
Patterns. This means that the worst-case password space for our
3D Pattern technique is better than that of both PIN (10000) and
(a) A screenshot of the smartphone
screen as the user sees it before au-
thenticating using the 3D Pattern
technique.
(b) An example reference image
shown to a participant when au-
thenticating using the 3D Pattern
technique.
Figure 2: The on-screen representation of the 3D Pattern
technique. The 3D cube is orthogonally projected on the
screen, with each layer represented using a different colour.
pattern (1400, computed using a similar Python script as above)
locks in the case of a four-digit PIN or pattern.
As with the conventional Android pattern lock, our 3D Pattern
lock has two modes: (1) with feedback and (2) without feedback. In
with feedback mode, as the user moves his or her finger between the
different points, a line is rendered between each of the connected
points. In no feedback mode, these lines are not rendered.
All three of our implemented techniques have additional haptic
feedback. This helps the users perceive whether their input has been
detected. In a very quiet environment, an attacker may be able to
hear the haptic feedback, but in the ambient noise of the experiment
room, the experimenters could not hear or otherwise detect the
haptic feedback as participants were authenticating. Similarly, an
attacker should not be able to hear the haptic feedback in a public
environment.
Our 3D Pattern lock additionally always renders a “cursor” on
the screen. The cursor changes colour depending on the finger’s
distance from the screen. Yellow represents that the finger is in the
closest layer to the user, orange represents the middle layer, and
red represents the layer closest to the screen. Figure 3 demonstrates
the authentication process.
5 IMPLEMENTATION
Pre-touch information is not yet available on current commercial
smartphones. As a result, we simulated pre-touch with fiducial-
based motion capture. Our system was set up in a 2m × 2m ×
3m room instrumented with six Vicon motion-capture cameras.
The cameras work together to triangulate the position of fiducial
markers on the user’s finger. The small grey spheres in Figure 3 are
examples of these markers. The motion capture system tracks both
4
(a) Starting authentication
(b) Connecting second point
(c) Connecting third point
(d) Finished authentication
Figure 3: Study participant authenticating using our 3D Pat-
tern technique. (a) The participant’s finger starts in the yel-
low layer, the closest layer to the participant. (b) The par-
ticipant moves his finger diagonally to a point in the middle
layer. (c) The participantmoves his finger to the point below
in the bottom layer. (d) The participant moves his finger di-
agonally up to a point in the middle layer, and the complete
pattern has been entered.
the smartphone and the finger positions. The absolute positions of
each of these objects in 3D space is transformed, resulting in finger
coordinates relative to the phone screen.
Our prototype implementation includes a main PC, which in-
struments the remaining parts of the system. The responsibilities
of the main PC include determining what to draw on the phone
screen, controlling the experiment, verifying PINs, and logging
useful information. The three authentication techniques were im-
plemented using the Unity game engine.1 The source code is avail-
able at https://github.com/spamalot/3D-Pattern-Lock. All six Vicon
cameras are connected to a Vicon server through a network switch.
This server calculates the absolute 3D positions of the user’s finger
and smartphone and forwards this information to the main PC.
The connection between the smartphone and the main PC is im-
plemented as a client-server architecture over a Wi-Fi connection.
The smartphone renders the authentication technique to the user
and accepts touch and dragging input. The system architecture is
depicted in Figure 4. If our system were to be implemented in prac-
tice, of course, all computation and sensing would be performed
on the smartphone itself.
To evaluate our technique, we compare it to two other popular
authentication techniques: PIN and pattern locks. We replicate
Android’s implementation of the techniques as closely as possible
to make a fair evaluation of our proposed technique. We do this by
rendering Android’s layout as a background, and overlaying buttons
or swipe zones on top of this image. This preserves the spacing
between UI elements present in the Android implementations. For
the Pattern lock, we empirically matched the width of each point’s
hit box with that of the Android implementation.
6 EXPERIMENT
We conducted an experiment to understand how quickly and ac-
curately users can authenticate using the 3D Pattern technique, as
well as the resistance of our technique against shoulder surfing.
Our hypotheses are that the 3D Pattern technique will be slightly
slower and less accurate than the PIN and pattern techniques, but
significantly more shoulder surfing resistant. We received approval
from our university’s research ethics board for this experiment
involving human participants (ORE# 22114).
We recruited six graduate student participants from the univer-
sity community via word of mouth. Participants each received a gift
card valued at $5 for their participation in the 30-minute session.
6.1 Participants
We recruited 6 participants (5 male, 1 female) with average age 24
(SD=2) to enter PINs on a mobile phone. All participants were right-
handed and used their right hand to authenticate using the three
implemented techniques (PIN, pattern, and 3D Pattern). Participants
reported using a diverse range of locks on their personal phones,
with one participant using a PIN keypad, another using Android
pattern lock, three using fingerprint reading, and one using iris
scanning.
1https://unity3d.com
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Figure 4: System architecture diagram of the prototype smartphone authentication techniques. Information flow is generally
from the left to the right. TheVicon cameras capture the position of fiducialmarkers in 3D space, and forward this information
to a Vicon server through a network switch. The Vicon server calculates the absolute positions of the smartphone and the
user’s finger, and forwards this over a link-local connection to the main PC. The main PC establishes a bidirectional Wi-
Fi connection with the smartphone through a router. It uses input data from the smartphone in conjunction with motion
capture object positions to operate the techniques. In practice, when pre-touch technology becomes commercially available,
all computation and sensing will be performed on the smartphone itself.
Figure 5: Room setup used for the experiment. Six Vicon
cameras were placed throughout the room. Participants sat
on a chair against the far wall, with a video camera pointing
over their left shoulder.
6.2 Apparatus
The previously described implementation was used for the experi-
ment. Figure 5 shows the general layout of the experiment room.
Participants sat against a wall with no motion capture cameras, to
minimize occlusion of the cameras. Participants authenticated on a
Google Pixel 3 smartphone. A 1080p video camera was mounted
on a tripod, aiming over the left shoulder of the participant. This
camera provided a clear view of the phone screen and was used to
mimic the view of a shoulder surfer.
6.3 Task
The experiment was divided into two sections. In the first section,
the participant was instructed to authenticate using each of the
three techniques. Input events on the smartphone were logged
on the main PC and videos of participants authenticating were
recorded.
All authentication techniques were four “digits” long; that is,
PINs had four numbers and patterns involved connecting four
points. Each point in the pattern corresponded to a digit. For 3D
Pattern lock, the top-left point of each layer corresponded to the
digits 0, 9, and 18. Within the same layer, the digits increased left
to right, top to bottom. For example, in the layer closest to the
screen, the top-left point corresponded to 0, the top-middle point
corresponded to 1, and so on.
For the second section, the participant was asked to shoulder
surf the videos of the previous participant authenticating; the last
successful (most practiced) authentication of each PIN or pattern for
each technique was shown. The first participant performed shoul-
der surfing once the last participant finished authenticating using
all techniques. The participant had up to 20 guesses to correctly
determine the PIN or pattern entered. While guessing, participants
were allowed to consult reference images of each authentication
technique (e.g., see Figure 2a). We chose to have our participants,
who used our 3D Pattern technique, be the shoulder surfers because
they were familiar with this novel technique.
6.4 Design and Procedure
The study was a within-subjects design with techniqe and trial
number as independent variables. Technique Entry Time, technique
Error Rate, and shoulder surfing Guesses were measured as depen-
dent variables. Techniqe had 3 levels: PIN, Pattern, and Pattern3D,
the last of which corresponded to our 3D Pattern design.
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Techniques were presented to participants in a Latin square
arrangement. For each technique, there were two PINs or patterns.
For each PIN or pattern, there were two blocks of authentication
trials, each with five trials. The first block of each PIN or pattern was
a practice round, and the data was not analyzed. The practice round
of Pattern and Pattern3D rendered in with feedback mode, which
rendered lines between connected points on the screen. However,
during the second block, the technique rendered inwithout feedback
mode.
PINs and patterns were randomly generated. During the first
section of the experiment, participants were allowed to look at
a separate computer monitor on which the reference PINs and
patterns were displayed. The pattern and 3D Pattern reference
images were rendered as they would be seen after being entered
on the phone screen (see Figure 2b). As described in Section 4.1,
to improve usability, patterns for the Pattern3D technique were
controlled to always start on the top (furthest from screen) layer.
7 RESULTS
A repeated measures ANOVA with Greenhouse-Geisser sphericity
correction found a significant main effect of techniqe on log-
transformed Entry Time (F1.36,6.84 = 22.79,p < 0.01,η2G = 0.71).
Post hoc paired t-tests with Holm correction showwith significance
that Pattern3D was slower than PIN (p < 0.0001) and Pattern
(p < 0.0001), and that PIN was slower than Pattern (p < 0.001). The
median time to authenticate using PIN was 3.0 seconds (IQR=1.2),
Pattern was 2.0 seconds (IQR=1.5), and Pattern3D was 8.0 seconds
(IQR=7.1). We also measured the “time from first digit”, or the
difference in time between the first input towards authenticating
and finishing authentication. The median time from first digit using
PIN was 2.0 seconds (IQR=1.0), Pattern was 1.3 seconds (IQR=0.8),
and Pattern3Dwas 4.7 seconds (IQR=4.4). These results are depicted
in Figure 6.
A Friedman rank sum test shows a significant effect of tech-
niqe on Error Rate (χ23 = 17.72,p < 0.001). Post hoc paired
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests with Holm correction show with signif-
icance that Pattern3D has a higher error rate than PIN (p < 0.0001)
and Pattern (p < 0.0001), but do not indicate any significant differ-
ence between PIN and Pattern (p = 0.57). The mean error rate for
PIN was 3% (SD=18%), Pattern was 2% (SD=13%), and Pattern3D
was 52% (SD=50%). These results are depicted in Figure 7.
An empirical CDF representing the number of guesses needed
to correctly guess a PIN or pattern from a shoulder-surfing video is
depicted in Figure 8. PIN and Pattern are similar in shoulder-surfing
resistance, whereas Pattern3D appears to have a slight advantage. A
Friedman rank sum test shows a significant effect of techniqe on
Guesses (χ23 = 9.4,p < 0.05). Post hoc paired Wilcoxon signed-rank
tests with Holm correction show with significance that Pattern3D
was harder to guess correctly than PIN (p < 0.01), but shows no
other significant effects. The mean number of guesses needed for
PIN was 1.3 (SD=1, median=1), Pattern was 2.0 (SD=1, median=1.5),
and Pattern3D was 5.3 (SD=6, median=2.5). One participant was
not able to guess one 3D Pattern within the given 20 trials.
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Figure 6: Median times taken to authenticate for each of
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Figure 7: Mean error rates for each of the authentication
techniques. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
8 DISCUSSION
Based on our experience designing and evaluating the 3D Pattern
technique, we discuss the shoulder-surfing resistance of the tech-
nique, and possible future directions for exploration.
8.1 Shoulder-Surfing Resistance
Statistical analysis shows that the shoulder-surfing resistance of the
3D Pattern technique is higher than that of PIN locks. The empirical
CDF of shoulder-surfing guesses (Figure 8) might indicate that the
3D Pattern technique is more shoulder surfing resistant than the
pattern technique. Because users hover their fingers in 3D space,
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Figure 8: Empirical CDF of number of guesses needed to cor-
rectly identify the PIN or pattern in the shoulder surfing
video.
it is hard for a shoulder surfer to guess the layer in which the
user’s finger hovers. Moreover, due to the fact that the pattern
and 3D Pattern locks rendered in without feedback mode, no lines
were rendered on the screen. This could explain why pattern lock
appeared slightly more shoulder surfing resistant than the PIN
technique.
Previouswork [21, 22] has used graphical visualisation to provide
more memorable passwords. Our technique could be expanded
to combine the ideas of both picture passwords and pre-touch
information. This would allow for the creation of meaningful and
easily remembered passwords that are less position sensitive.
8.2 Equipment Resolution and Latency
The Vicon tracking system has the potential to be very accurate
when tracking, but this depends on a number of environmental
factors such as lighting, camera placement, and so on. In the study
at hand, there was some visible jitter in the position of the tracked
objects, likely slowing down participants when using the 3D Pattern
technique. While not reported by participants, wearing the fiducial
marker with double-sided tape on the finger may have caused dis-
comfort and also slowed down authentication time. Further, due
to network latency and the high frequency of messages being sent
across the network, user interface latency was low but apparent
with all three techniques, potentially affecting the external validity
of our study. In the future, smartphones with built-in pre-touch sup-
port would eliminate the need for motion capture and its associated
limitations.
8.3 Visualization of the Cube
Representing the 3D cube on the 2D phone screen is important
for our technique to be effective. Our choice to use orthogonal
projection may have negatively affected our results both in terms
of authentication speed and error rate.
One possible way to extend our design would be to use different
kinds of depth cues. Our implementation uses a cursor with varying
colours and sizes based on depth. We could instead visualize shad-
ows to give an impression of finger height. The distance between
the cursor and its shadow and shadow size could be varied with
finger height. Alternatively, a depth-of-field blurring effect based
on the finger’s distance from the screen could be used. Another
possible extension would be to investigate if the use of perspective
projection instead of our implemented orthogonal projection would
have better performance. It could also be effective to slightly rotate
the projection of the cube depending on the position of the finger
or orientation of the smartphone.
8.4 Experimental Protocol
Our experiment allowed the user to practice each technique five
times. Given the novelty of pre-touch interfaces, this might not have
been enough practice rounds for users to become accustomed to this
new paradigm. Further in support of this argument is the fact that
participants took several seconds between starting authentication
and entering the first digit for the 3D Pattern technique. Users
needed to adjust the position of their fingers to find the correct
position of the top layer.
Compared to previous studies [10], both our implementations of
PIN authentication and pattern authentication were slower. The are
several factors that could have contributed to these results. First, the
main PC, rather than the smartphone, performed all calculations,
resulting in a possible small effect of network latency. We also
found that participants sometimes referred back to the secondary
computer monitor to recall which PIN or pattern to enter.
9 CONCLUSION
In this work, we have proposed a novel approach to smartphone
authentication using pre-touch information, called 3D Pattern. We
have implemented a prototype of the technique by simulating a
pre-touch-capable smartphone using a motion capture system. We
have also evaluated the 3D Pattern technique in a pilot study, in
comparison to two popular existing techniques, finding that au-
thentication times were longer, but that the technique could be
more resistant to shoulder-surfing attacks, while being immune to
smudge attacks. We attribute the longer authentication times to en-
vironmental conditions adversely affecting motion capture and the
novelty of pre-touch to participants. We believe these limitations
could be easily overcome as pre-touch becomes mainstream.
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